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Rights-based Theories of Accident Law 
 




No extant theory of accident law adequately addresses a central 
normative concern in accidents: What criteria should determine the amount 
of precaution an individual must employ to avoid being justifiably assigned 
others’ costs from an accident?   
The central normative concern is central in assigning accident costs for 
at least two reasons.  First, disputes about who should bear the costs of 
accidents often hinge on determinations of the amount of precaution one or 
more individuals should have taken in the acts that led to the accident.  
Second, from the perspective of a person interested in not having to pay for 
the accident costs others incur, that person wants to know at least the 
minimum amount of precaution that she should employ to avoid having to 
justifiably bear others’ accident costs.1  In short, she wants to know how 
careful she should be to avoid being (successfully and justifiably) sued. 
For example, much controversy exists over whether drivers should be 
phoning while driving.  Suppose Eman is phoning while driving when he 
and Woomin accidentally collide.  Woomin was driving as well but was not 
phoning or breaking any traffic laws or doing anything else that would 
increase the dangerousness of driving.  The accident seems like it would not 
have occurred if Eman had not been phoning while driving.  Both Eman and 
Woomin suffer bodily injury and property damage to their vehicles. 
                                                 
 Gregory J. Hall, Sharswood Fellow in Law and Political Theory at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.  I would like to thank Stephen Perry, Anita Allen, Kok-Chor 
Tan, and Samuel Freeman whose insights and vision have made this project possible.  I 
would also like to thank Adrienne Martin and her class in Scholarship in Ethical Theory at 
the philosophy department at the University of Pennsylvania for their comments when I 
presented to them an earlier draft of this paper.  Ideas in this paper were also presented to 
the Penn Law Faculty Roundtable from whom I received constructive suggestions.  Much 
thanks goes to Gideon Parchomovsky and Jean Galbraith for their critical feedback on the 
manuscript and Ellen Qualey for her research assistance.  This paper was made possible by 
a generous fellowship from the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
1 This concern could be only a descriptive concern about what actual courts are likely to 
do, but I am assuming the person is also concerned what should be done at least so that she 
has some argument to defend herself in court and because she wants the law to be morally 
justifiable.  
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If Woomin seeks compensation for her accident costs from Eman and he 
disputes his responsibility for her costs, resolution of the dispute may hinge 
on whether Eman employed too little precaution by phoning while driving.  
For the future, Eman and other drivers have an interest in knowing whether 
phoning while driving employs too little precaution such that they should be 
assigned the costs of others if an accident results.  
Despite the importance of the central normative concern, social-utility-
based theories of accident law and rights-based theories of accident law do 
not adequately address this concern in different ways.2  Social-utility-based 
theories of accident law state the criteria that they endorse for the central 
normative concern but fail to adequately justify the criteria.  In particular, 
theories that employ efficiency or some form of cost-benefit reasoning to 
assess accident law seem to think that it is obvious why their criterion is the 
proper one to use.3  Thus, they provide little to no justification for their 
criterion’s application to assigning accident costs.  Other social-utility-
based theories such as the theory advocated by Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell use social welfare as the metric for assigning accident costs.4  Even 
though the theory tries to justify social welfare as opposed to fairness as the 
criterion to assign accident costs, the theory does not defend a particular 
way to weight the components of social welfare.5  Without particular 
weights, social welfare analysis does not provide a determinate theory for 
assigning accident costs.6 
While social-utility-based theories do not adequately justify their 
criteria for assigning accident costs, rights-based theories of accident law 
have different shortcomings.  However, the shortcomings of rights-based 
theories have not received much attention.7  The project for this article is to 
uncover these shortcomings to clear the way for a new theory of assigning 
accident costs, a theory that has a robust justificatory basis.   
                                                 
2 Steven Hetcher makes a similar point but phrases it in terms of these theorists ignoring 
the significance of the jury’s role in tort law.  Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social 
Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 633-36 (2003). 
3 WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW (1987).  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
4 LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 3 (2002). 
5 Daniel Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity? 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1791, 1793 (2003). 
6 Ultimately I find the social-utility-based approach unsatisfying because it cannot 
account for John Rawls’s idea of the separateness of persons, certain interests of a person 
should not be sacrificed for the benefit of society.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26-
27 (1971). 
   7 See LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 91-93 (2002).  
They are some of the most vocal critics of how rights-based theories fail to address the 
central normative concern. 
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Broadly stated, the shortcoming of rights-based theories is that these 
theories barely address the central normative concern—What criteria should 
determine the amount of precaution an individual must employ to avoid 
being justifiably assigned others’ costs from an accident?8  Such an 
omission is puzzling because rights-based theories address many other 
components of extant tort law’s doctrine and institutional structure.  These 
theories usually cover the central normative concern by endorsing the 
reasonable person standard.9  However, rarely do these theories provide 
criteria to determine what the reasonable person standard requires in 
specific situations.10  Even when they provide some content to the 
reasonable person standard by appeals to intuition, convention, or usual 
practices, they do not provide a justification for using such content to assign 
accident costs.11   
                                                 
8 Some theorists are an exception to this claim because they advocate for some form of 
social tort insurance.  See David H. Blankfein Tabachnick and Kevin A. Kordana, On 
Belling the Cat: Rawls & Tort as Corrective Justice,  92 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1279 
(2006); Ronen Avraham and Issa Kohler Housmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 
LEGAL THEORY 181 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, 
in David Owen, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (1995); Marc A. 
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 
53 VA. L. REV. 774, 808–814 (1967); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 
73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985); Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does 
Tort Law Make Sense? 6 LAW & PHIL. 1–23 (1987); Christopher Schroeder, Corrective 
Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990).  I exclude these 
theorists from my present considerations because I am assuming that accident costs from at 
least some acts should be borne only by the individuals involved in the accident rather than 
by society as a whole.  
9 I have in mind primarily Ernest Weinrib.  ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE 
LAW 147-52 (1995).  Arthur Ripstein is also an example of such a theorist even though he 
adds some further criteria.  Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of 
Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004).   Benjamin Zipursky and Jules Coleman are 
examples although it is not clear that they are engaged in normative (as opposed to 
descriptive) tort theory.  Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 
GEORGETOWN L. J.  695 (2003);  JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992).  Kaplow 
and Shavell also note that it is unclear the extent to which tort theorists in the rights-based 
tradition (my term) are engaged in descriptive theory or normative theory.  Kaplow and 
Shavell at 91-93. 
10 George Fletcher is a notable exception to this generalization.  George Fletcher, 
Fairness and Utility in the Law of Torts, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).  Jody Kraus 
emphasizes the importance of legal theory coming up with determinate answers to 
particular cases.  Jody Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1773 (2007).   
11 Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 119 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001).  JULES COLEMAN, 
RISKS AND WRONGS (1992).  However, doing so is not Coleman’s purpose. 
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Returning to the example of phoning while driving, none of the rights-
based theories of assigning accident costs provide adequate answers to 
whether phoning while driving employs too little precaution.  Thus, these 
theories do not provide adequate answers about how the costs from Eman 
and Woomin’s accident should be assigned.   
With such inadequacies, the rights-based approach to accident law has 
(not surprisingly) lost much ground in legal academia to the social-utility-
based approach.  By highlighting the inadequacies in extant rights-based 
theories of accident law, I aim to show what issues a rights-based theory 
must meet to advance a compelling alternative to the social-utility-based 
approach. 
After preliminaries, I sketch the reasonable person theory of assigning 
accident costs.  Although ambiguous, the reasonable person theory can be 
interpreted as a rights-based theory.  Due to its enigmatic and ambiguous 
use of ‘reasonable,’ the reasonable person theory of assigning accident costs 
cannot be relied on to answer the central normative concern.  Next, I offer 
Kantian political theory as a compelling paradigm to determine if any other 
more developed rights-based theory of assigning accident costs is adequate 
and persuasive.  Once I demonstrate the particular shortcomings of each 
extant rights-based theory, I briefly outline a democratic theory of assigning 
accident costs that has a chance of adequately addressing the central 
normative concern.    
 
I.  Preliminaries 
Even though I focus on theories of tort law, I do not think the extant 
institution of tort law is theoretically the most important place to examine 
how we should assign the costs of accidents.  Instead, I focus on tort law 
(accident law in particular) because I think that by eliminating its 
murkiness, we can address the central normative concern more clearly from 
a non-institutional perspective.   
This non-institutional perspective does not first explore, for example, 
which decision-makers should decide how to assign accident costs.  Since 
some kinds of decision-makers (e.g. courts or insurance companies) may be 
better at assigning accident costs depending on the requisite criteria, I 
address the criteria identified in the central normative concern first.  
Answering the central normative concern first may help us determine how 
to shape the institution(s) to assign accident costs because institutional 
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issues are likely partly dependent on the answer to the central normative 
concern.12   
By now, it may be apparent that I am interested in the normative 
question of how to assign costs from accidental harm as opposed to 
intentional harm.  So, when I refer to tort law or tort theory, I am 
exclusively referring to the aspects that govern accidental torts rather than 
intentional torts.  While we have an intuitive sense of what accidental harm 
is, explicitly defining it is tricky.13  Stephen Perry provides a helpful 
definition: unintentional (accidental) harm is “harm to which an agent 
causally contributed but that he did not intend to bring about and that he 
was not substantially certain would occur.”14   
Several aspects of accidents and accident law are not my inquiry.  I am 
not addressing what constitutes causation of harm, what is the scope of 
one’s duty to take care not to injure others, what types of harm should be 
compensable, or how one should assess compensation for accidental harm.  
Instead, I am only addressing what sorts of acts should be the bases for 
compensation when these acts lead to accidental harm (i.e. the central 
normative concern).   
                                                 
12 While extant tort law makes the bilateral relationship salient, other institutional 
mechanisms could recognize the bilateral relationship.  Even social tort insurance could 
maintain a bilateral relationship by conditioning compensation on a showing of fault (such 
as requiring the police officer on the scene to determine fault) and requiring the faulty party 
to pay higher premiums going forward.  Although the evidentiary burden would be less, 
this kind of system would monetarily affect the parties to the accident in the same way as 
the tort system (assuming liability insurance).   
13 Comments e, d, and f in Restatement 2nd of Torts § 282 imply that that negligent torts 
are all remaining torts after one has separated the intentional torts, the reckless torts, and 
torts of strict liability.  This provides a negative definition rather than a positive definition 
of a negligent tort making it seem easier to say what negligence is not compared to saying 
what negligence is.  The Restatement uses negligence to mean “conduct which falls below 
the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm.”  Restat 2d of Torts, § 282. 
14 Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS (Gerald Postema ed., 2001).  This definition can be 
made more precise because, as it stands, Perry’s definition seems to include harm from an 
intentional tort.  The perpetrator of an intentional tort intends to cause harm to which the 
victim also causally contributed.  So, the definition could be made more precise though 
also more cumbersome: accidental harm is harm to which an agent causally contributed but 
that neither he nor one other causally-related person intended to bring about and that those 
two were not substantially certain would occur.  Note that harm can be accidental with 
regard to one person while intentional with regard to another person.  Also, accidental harm 
could also extend to harm to which no agent causally contributed such as when lightning 
strikes a tree in an undiscovered island.  Tort law does not address this latter kind of case.  
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II. The Reasonable Person Theory  
Although reasonable person legal doctrine as found in United States tort 
law can be ambiguous, one plausible interpretation conceives of it as a 
rights-based theory.  I begin with this rights-based reasonable person theory 
to demonstrate that rights-based tort theories cannot rely on it to answer the 
central normative concern.  Additionally, unveiling the shortcomings of the 
reasonable person theory demonstrates one inadequate rights-based theory 
while simultaneously demonstrating the need to adequately answer the 
central normative concern. 
The reasonable person theory of assigning accident costs as found in 
United States tort law is challenging to articulate because many judges 
developed it over time through the common law.  The reasonable person 
theory has also been articulated or commented on in various ways by legal 
theorists.  In formulating the reasonable person theory, I am not trying to 
synthesize all of these various sources or versions.  Rather, by ‘reasonable 
person theory’ I mean to outline the general way the extant accident law in 
the United States common law approaches negligence as well as how it 
distinguishes negligence from strict liability.15  To do so, I explicate the 
Restatement 2nd of Torts because it attempts to synthesize the case law. 
A. Ambiguities Uncovered 
In analyzing the Restatement’s version of the reasonable person theory, 
I aim to capture the extent to which judges and commentators have 
formulated accident law doctrine.16  I say the ‘extent’ because I argue that 
judges and commentators do not provide enough clear legal doctrine to 
explain and justify particular decisions in accident cases.17  Also, it is 
unclear whether one aspect of the Restatement 2nd of Torts reflects actual 
judicial practice at the trial level.  These shortcomings of the law, as 
evidenced in the Restatement, are what I take to be the impetus for legal 
theorists to try to explain and justify accident law in terms of a more robust 
theory of the reasonable person, cost-benefit analysis, or reciprocity.      
The reasonable person theory assigns the costs of an accident to the 
individuals involved in the accident rather than to the community as a 
                                                 
15 Alongside the reasonable person theory to accident law exists the doctrine of strict 
liability.  Strict liability only applies to limited, specific kinds of acts—usually extra-
ordinarily dangerous acts—which judges have carved out.  I address strict liability later. 
16 I ignore differences among the states concerning their tort doctrine because my focus is 
on a characteristic that I believe the states all share. 
17 Jody Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1773, 1775 (2007). 
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whole.18  As the default, the reasonable person theory assigns each accident 
cost to each person or group19 who incurred that cost.20  The reasonable 
person theory allows a reassignment of the costs from the default 
assignment if one of the parties to the accident can demonstrate that another 
party acted negligently.21  Acting negligently means, according to this 
theory, that the person acted unreasonably according to the objective 
reasonable person standard (described below).22  If one or more parties 
involved in an accident acted unreasonably, the reasonable person theory 
deems that person or persons at fault for the accident.  For only one at fault 
party, the costs of the other parties to the accident may be reassigned to the 
at fault party.  If more than one party is at fault, the costs of the accident 
may be reassigned either jointly or in proportion to their degree of fault 
(unreasonableness).23  
To illustrate, recall the accident between Woomin and Eman resulting 
from Eman’s phoning while driving.  If Woomin chooses, the reasonable 
person theory allows her to instigate a legal action to get Eman to pay 
certain of her costs from the accident, if she can demonstrate that Eman 
acted unreasonably.24  If Eman acted unreasonably by phoning while 
                                                 
18 Christopher Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 439, 439 (1990).   
19 One group could be a government, but the reasonable person theory is treating the 
government like a person rather than as a mechanism to spread the costs to members of 
society. 
20 Restat 2d of Torts, § 281.  What counts as an individual incurring a cost is the damage 
to his property, injury to his body, economic losses based on what the person would have 
gained without the accident, and other losses that setback a person’s interests.  
Traditionally, economic losses that do not result from a physical injury to the person’s 
property or body are still losses to the person but are not compensable losses in tort 
doctrine. 
21 The reasonable person theory was developed by judges in the context of tort law 
adjudications although nothing about the approach prohibits it from being used in other 
institutional settings.  Since judges developed the reasonable person theory in an 
adversarial legal system, the individual seeking compensation from another must prove that 
the other person was at fault for the accident while the alleged faulty party must defend 
herself to avoid receiving a judgment requiring her to compensate the individual seeking 
compensation.   
   22 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. 
   23 Which of these two options is available in an accident case depends on the particular 
way the courts in each state have developed this aspect of tort doctrine.  
24 Who else is involved in the accident has often been interpreted broadly to include 
individuals who were not present during the accident but had some tie to the accident such 
as employers whose employees were involved in the accident and producers of a product 
involved in an accident.  The potential candidates to bear the costs of the accident, while 
broad, has not been expanded to society as a whole in U.S. tort law. 
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driving, the reasonable person theory would reassign Woomin’s accident 
costs to him.     
As stated above, the reasonable person theory defines its species of fault 
according to the objective reasonable person standard.  To sketch the 
objective reasonable person standard, I rely on the Restatement 2nd of Torts.   
The words “reasonable man” denote a person exercising those 
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which 
society requires of its members for the protection of their own 
interests and the interests of others.25 
While the Restatement’s denotation of the concept of reasonable person 
indicates the categories of qualities that are important to the concept and the 
purpose of the concept, it does not tell us exactly what those qualities are 
for specific situations.  For instance, would the reasonable person phone 
while driving?  Would phoning impede too much her attention and perhaps 
judgment while driving?  Not listing the specific qualities for each category 
needed under what conditions is understandable due to the variety of acts 
individuals can undertake, the complex ways acts can intersect, rule of law 
principles, and the limits of human foresight.  Due in part to these 
considerations, judges developed the reasonable person theory in the form 
of a standard rather than a more precise rule or list of rules. 
The Restatement does state that these categories of qualities (attention, 
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment) are filled out by what ‘society 
requires of its members.’  However, two problems arise with this society-
phrase.  First, it is not clear how this society-phrase is a restatement of tort 
law at the trial court level.26  Jury instructions do not explicitly instruct 
jurors to decide what ‘society requires of its members;’ jury instructions 
simply ask jurors to determine what a reasonable person would have done 
in the defendant’s situation.27  If we ignore the society-phrase in the 
Restatement because it is not used in jury instructions, we have even less 
                                                 
25 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.  Note that the Restatement 2nd uses the sex-specific term 
‘man’ when it seems to mean ‘person’ which is why I rename the test.  “The fact that this 
judgment is personified in a "man" calls attention to the necessity of taking into account the 
fallibility of human beings.”  Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.  I do not mean to preclude the 
feminist critique that the standard has been a male standard.  By using ‘reasonable person’ 
instead, I attempt to use a sex-neutral standard consistent with the other language that the 
Restatement 2nd uses. 
   26 Some appellate decisions have phrased the reasonable person standard in terms of the 
“community ideal of reasonable behavior.”26  However, it is not clear whether the court is 
merely rehashing the Restatement 2nd of Torts or whether the court is providing clarity and 
direction to trial courts. 
27 This claim is based on a survey of many states model jury instructions for negligence 
cases.  See document on file with the author. 
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guidance about what should flesh out the reasonable person standard.  
Getting from reasonable person jury instructions to a notion that the 
objective reasonable person standard should be filled out by what ‘society 
requires of its members’ requires a few steps of reasoning that are not 
provided by jurists or commentators.   
The second problem is that, even if we retain the Restatement’s added 
phrase, we still cannot adequately flesh out the reasonable person standard.  
To determine precisely what ‘society requires of its members,’ ambiguities 
need clarifying.  What ‘society requires of its members’ is ambiguous in at 
least two ways.  The phrase does not spell out what constitutes the relevant 
‘society.’  Is it the neighborhood, the town, the county, the nation-state, a 
region of nation-states, the hemisphere, the world?   
The other ambiguity concerns the nature of the society’s requirement.  
The use of society doing the requiring is murky from the outset because it is 
a personification of society.  Determining what ‘society requires’ at least 
involves some sense of how individuals’ actions (including their beliefs) 
combine together into an action of ‘society requiring.’   
Setting the personification issue largely aside, another ambiguity 
involves two possible interpretations of what ‘society requires of its 
members.’  The society-phrase could refer to the demands of morality.  
Under that interpretation, society is a shorthand way of expressing the 
objectively correct moral point of view.  With this interpretation inserted 
explicitly into the text, the Restatement would read: 
The words "reasonable man" denote a person exercising those 
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which 
morality requires of individuals for the protection of their own 
interests and the interests of others.28 
Indeed, the further qualification that the ‘reasonable person’ standard be 
objective29 favors this moral interpretation because the moral point of view 
is often associated with an objective point of view.30   
Another interpretation of what ‘society requires of its members’ could 
be what are the actual social norms or conventions (conventions, for short) 
of a particular society.  These conventions could be codified in bodies of 
laws or regulations.  For example, when driving the reasonable person may 
                                                 
28 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283 modified as indicated in italics. 
29 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. 
30 David Hume, John Locke, and John Rawls all use constructs that abstract from 
subjective knowledge to argue for the correct view of moral claims.  DAVID HUME, A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 580 (1888).  JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON 
GOVERNMENT 189 (1821).  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).  
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follow all traffic regulations.  The norms could also remain informal 
without explicit validation by any part of the government.  An example of a 
possible convention is, As soon as possible, clean up a spill that causes 
slippery conditions on a surface (which you own) that people often traverse.   
The convention-based interpretation of the reasonable person standard 
may seem to follow more directly from the Restatement’s text than the 
morality-based interpretation because a social group (society) is doing the 
requiring.  However, once again, the convention-based interpretation does 
not obviously comport with jury instructions in trial courts, where the 
Restatement’s phrase ‘what society requires of its members’ is not used.  
Jurors are only instructed to determine what the reasonable person would 
have done without disambiguating whether they are being asked for an 
answer based on morality or an answer based on facts about the conventions 
of their society.31   
The rest of the text of the Restatement does not resolve the ambiguities 
identified above.  The Restatement adds to its denotation of ‘reasonable 
man’ what it conceives of as the “standard of the reasonable man.” 
Standard of the "reasonable man."  Negligence is a departure from a 
standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection 
of others against unreasonable risk.32  
                                                 
31 See model jury instructions for the states.  For example, here is an example of jury 
instruction from Vermont adapted to the case of Woomin and Eman: Woomin claims that 
Eman was negligent in phoning while driving.  Eman was negligent if he was not 
reasonably careful in phoning while driving.  That does not mean that Eman had to use the 
greatest possible care, like an unusually cautious person.  Rather, he had to exercise the 
same care a reasonable person would have done in her same circumstances, taking into 
account the foreseeable risk of injury caused by her actions.  Not every injury is caused by 
negligence; sometimes accidents happen even when people act reasonably.  Vermont Civil 
Jury Instruction Committee, Negligence, http://www.vtbar.org/Upload%20Files/WebPages/ 
Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/Negligence.htm accessed on 
January 5, 2011. 
Note that the jury is not asked to determine if the defendant had reasons to do what she 
did.  That would be a question of whether the defendant acted rationally rather than 
reasonably—to put it in Rawlsian terms.  Instead, the jury is asked to determine if the 
person behaved reasonably, but they are not told what reasonable means in the particular 
context that the defendant was in.  That is the question they are to answer without further 
guidance. 
32 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.  Here the Restatement seems to equate negligence with the 
standard of the reasonable person.  While the statement about negligence is a fair 
characterization, putting that sentence just after the phrase ‘standard of the reasonable man’ 
is misleading because the ‘standard of conduct demanded by the community’ (as 
recognized in extant tort law) is higher, lower, or more specific than the pure reasonable 
person standard when the age, technical knowledge, or the agent’s choices are factored into 
the standard of conduct.   
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The use of ‘community’ here instead of ‘society’ suggests that the relevant 
group is smaller than the whole world and consists of a group with some 
commonality.  However, the text does not explicitly define its previous use 
of ‘society’ in terms of community.  Thus, if the two phrases indicate two 
different relevant groups, the Restatement contradicts itself.   
Even if we interpret ‘community’ as superseding or coextensive with 
the Restatement’s use of ‘society’ as the relevant group, the neighborhood, 
the town, the county, the state, the nation-state, and even groups not 
exclusively within a political or geographical boundary remain viable 
candidates for what constitutes the community.  Hence, the ambiguity 
regarding the scope of the community that does the ‘requiring’ or the 
‘demanding’ remains. 
Assuming that ‘community’ is what the Restatement means, the use of 
‘community’ may seem to resolve the ambiguity concerning whether 
morality or conventions fill out the reasonable person standard.  
‘Community’ suggests something less than the moral point of view, 
something particularized to a specific group of people.  If so, then what the 
community requires (or demands) is adherence to its norms and conventions 
rather than adherence to the requirements of morality.   
While drawing this implication from the use of ‘community’ may push 
us toward the convention-based interpretation, the implication does not 
necessarily follow.  ‘Community’ could be a term indicating the moral point 
of view because the community could require that its citizens follow the 
requirements of morality.  Moreover, the next part of the text pushes us 
towards the morality-based interpretation.  It reads as follows: 
The standard which the community demands must be an objective 
and external one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good 
or bad, of the particular individual.  It must be the same for all 
persons, since the law can have no favorites…33 
Stating that the standard that the community demands must be objective 
suggests the moral point of view, as mentioned above.  Norms and 
conventions may not be objective but may rather be the subjective beliefs or 
preferences of all or part of the individuals in the community.  Furthermore, 
stating that the standard must be external also suggests the moral point of 
view because such would be external to the community’s norms and 
conventions.   
The rather-than-phrase could mean that the standard is objective and 
external only relative to any particular individual in the community instead 
                                                 
33 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. 
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of objective and external to the whole community.  However, the morality-
based interpretation would also be objective and external relative to any 
particular individual.  So, both interpretations are still possible.   
The since-phrase may push us towards the morality-based interpretation.  
By stating that the standard must be the same for “all persons,” it suggests 
the moral point of view because the requirements of morality are usually the 
same for all persons.  In contrast, community norms and conventions vary 
between communities.  However, “all persons” could be all persons in the 
community.  So, both interpretations remain viable. 
Importantly, the text does not justify why either the morality-based 
interpretation or the convention-based interpretation should be decisive in a 
legal action.34  Besides not informing us why the reasonable person theory 
is justified, this lack of justification perpetuates the ambiguity in the 
reasonable person theory between the morality-based interpretation and the 
convention-based interpretation of what the community demands. 
Another piece of the Restatement further exacerbates this ambiguity.   
Weighing interests.  The judgment which is necessary to decide 
whether the risk so realized is unreasonable, is that which is 
necessary to determine whether the magnitude of the risk outweighs 
the value which the law attaches to the conduct which involves it.35  
 
This comment appears to be offering a third way, often called the Learned 
Hand test, to determine whether an actor is reasonable.  Some claim that 
weighing interests according to the Learned Hand test is exactly what a 
reasonable person would do.36  However, weighing interests to gauge 
whether “the magnitude of the risk outweighs the value which the law 
attaches to the conduct” may not always be the same as doing what the 
community demands of its citizens (at least under the convention-based 
interpretation).  For example, the community may not demand that citizens 
avoid phoning while driving even though the magnitude of the risk of an 
accident may outweigh the value of phoning while driving.  At least, the 
Restatement does not state that what the community demands of its citizens 
is determined by this weighing of interests.  Thus, the weighing-interests-
                                                 
34 Particular judicial opinions may offer some justification. But, since the Restatement 
does not mention these, I take it that the reasonable person theory has not affirmed a 
particular interpretation. 
35 Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. 
36 Posner initially made this claim.  Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 THE 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32-34 (1972).   
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based interpretation of the reasonable person standard can conflict with the 
convention-based interpretation.37   
The weighing-interests-based interpretation could be a clarification of 
the morality-based interpretation of what a community demands of its 
members.  It seems to capture the law and economics approach to 
negligence, which endorses a morality-based version of the Learned Hand 
test.38   
On the other hand, since this connection is not done explicitly, we are 
left with the ambiguity because the weighing-interests-based interpretation 
is not the only morality-based interpretation available to instantiate the 
morality-based interpretation of the reasonable person standard.  Other 
possible morality-based interpretations include intuitionism, pragmatism, 
and rights-based theories.  While all of these moral theories may agree on 
what the reasonable person would have done in some cases, in other cases 
the theories come up with different answers.39  So, merely identifying one 
morality-based interpretation without tying it to what the community 
demands does not resolve the ambiguity of what constitutes the objective 
reasonable person standard.   
To be clear, I am not denying that one theory could unite the seemingly 
incongruous parts of the Restatement such that the reasonable person theory 
would offer determinate answers on how to assign accident costs.  The law 
and economics approach seems to do just that.  What I am claiming is that 
the reasonable person theory as developed in the common law and 
articulated in the Restatement does not by itself provide determinate 
answers on how to assign accident costs in many cases.  In other words, as 
far as I can tell, the ambiguities I identified above in the phrase ‘what 
society requires of its members’ are not resolved in the reasonable person 
theory as developed in the common law.  The phrase remains ambiguous 
relying on the decision-maker (e.g. judge or jury) to adopt (intentionally or 
unintentionally) one version of the ambiguities. 
 
                                                 
37 In the Ford Pinto case and other similar cases not only do juries find companies who 
weigh interests in the Learned Hand test style negligent and liable for the costs of the 
accident, but juries also attach punitive damages on top of the costs of the accidents.  This 
suggests that Learned Hand test reasoning, at least in some cases, does not equate with the 
jurors’ understanding of reasonableness at all.  Instead, Learned Hand test reasoning may 
equate with recklessness worthy of punishment.  W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: 
A Reckless Act? 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1999-2000). 
38 Kenneth W. Simmons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Tradeoffs: A Closer 
Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1172-73 (2008). 
39 Simmons at 1173-80. 
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B. Strict Liability Separated   
The reasonable person theory (negligence) could be used to assign the 
costs from all accidents.  However, judges separately developed strict 
liability, a standard of care for narrow kinds of acts that the judges 
identified.40  Judges have applied strict liability to accidents resulting from 
livestock or abnormally dangerous animals that individuals maintain on 
their property.  Another category judges have applied strict liability to is 
abnormally dangerous acts.  This category of strict liability is laid out in the 
Restatement as follows: 
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to 
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting 
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to 
prevent the harm. 
Strict liability is strict because the agent doing the abnormally dangerous act 
is subject to liability even if the agent met the objective reasonable person 
standard and even if the agent met a seemingly stricter standard of 
exercising the “utmost care to prevent the harm.”  So, having caused a 
foreseeable harm via an abnormally dangerous act is usually enough to 
establish liability for accident costs whereas with negligence (reasonable 
person theory) causation alone is necessary but not sufficient to establish 
liability.41 
Strict liability could be used to assign the costs of all accidents as long 
as the person seeking compensation can prove that another person “caused” 
the accident.42  Richard Epstein has espoused such a theory.43  Common law 
judges did not go this route choosing instead to use the reasonable person 
theory in one domain and to use the strict liability approach in other limited 
domains.  Keeping these domains separate is entrenched in the common 
law.  However, common law judges have not provided a deep theoretical 
                                                 
40 This description is not meant to be a historical description, nor does it take a position 
on the issue of whether strict liability was formerly applied ubiquitously and negligence 
added later. 
41 Strict liability is not absolute liability because some qualifications can absolve one of 
liability.  See for example, Restat 2d of Torts, § 519, Comment on Subsection (2)e; Madsen 
v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 101 Utah 552; 125 P.2d 794; 1942 Utah LEXIS 24 (1942) (where 
defendant was not held strictly liable because the type of harm that occurred to the 
neighboring mink farm was not foreseeable breaking the legal causal link). 
42 Perry argues that cause in such a theory must have some normative component to it.  
Stephen R. Perry, Libertarianism, Entitlement, and Responsibility, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
351, 381 (1997).   
43 Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). 
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justification for the division between negligence (reasonable person theory) 
and strict liability.44   
The lack of a theoretical justification for the division between strict 
liability and negligence (reasonable person theory) make the judicial answer 
to the central normative concern murky.  Along with the ambiguities within 
the reasonable person theory identified above, the murkiness of accident 
law is severe.  Unsatisfied with this murkiness, theorists have tried to flesh 
out what the objective reasonable person standard requires.  Before we can 
evaluate these attempts to flesh out the reasonable person standard, we need 
a criterion to evaluate whether these attempts are successful.  In the next 
section, I outline such a criterion. 
III.  Kantian Normative Political Theory 
As I stated at the outset, the social-utility-based approach and the rights-
based approach dominate the theory of assigning accident costs.  While 
social utility theories fail to adequately defend their criteria, I am not taking 
issue with the social-utility-based approach in this article.  Instead, I am 
focusing on two problems with extant rights-based theories.  First, rights-
based theories fail to provide complete, determinate criteria for assigning 
accident costs.  I have already shown that the reasonable person theory is 
riddled with this problem.  Second, even those who provide some criteria 
for assigning accident costs fail to adequately justify those criteria.  To 
make salient these two problems, I provide Kantian political theory through 
which we may evaluate these theories of assigning accident costs. 
I recommend Kantian political theory because rights-based theories of 
assigning accident costs often claim to be based on this major branch of 
normative liberal political theory.  The branch includes John Locke, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and John 
Rawls.  I focus on a distinctly Rawlsian version of this branch.  Although I 
do not have space to defend the persuasiveness of this branch of political 
theory, I take it that the persuasiveness of Kantian normative liberal 
political theory (Kantian political theory, for short) is evident based on its 
prominence in political theory literature and in the forthcoming arguments.   
A foundational element of Kantian political theory is the concept of the 
free and equal person.  Determining the requirements of Kantian political 
theory involves reasoning about what kind of society treats persons with 
                                                 
44 Some tort theorists have tried to reconcile or justify the division between negligence 
and strict liability. 
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equal concern.45  Another way to state this form of reasoning is by 
considering what kind of society free and equal persons would choose given 
limitations about what can bias their choices.46  The outcome of the most 
persuasive reasoning from the basis of free and equal persons provides the 
structure of the political society required by morality according to Kantian 
political theory. 
Based on Rawls’s work, the free and equal person would choose the 
kind of society where she could develop her most valued capacities.47  One 
of these capacities is her ability to develop, revise, and pursue her own life 
plan; this capacity reflects her value of being free.48  The free and equal 
person does not want to pursue her life plan regardless of how it affects 
other people.  Instead, she values her capacity to cooperate with other 
people based on fair terms of social cooperation; this capacity reflects her 
value of being equal.49  Another part of being equal means that a free and 
equal person does not make choices that discriminate against persons based 
on morally arbitrary characteristics such as their gender, wealth of their 
society, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or place in history.50  Putting these 
together, the free and equal person would choose a kind of society where 
each individual can pursue each individual’s own life plan according to fair 
terms of cooperation that do not discriminate against persons based on 
morally arbitrary characteristics.  Determining what fair terms the free and 
equal person would choose provides the structure of the political society 
required by Kantian political theory. 
As fair terms, the free and equal person would choose a normative 
division between the domain of the individual and the domain of the 
social.51  This normative division provides the individual space to pursue 
her life plan while making sure other individuals are also able to pursue 
                                                 
45 This formulation is based off of Ronald Dworkin’s writings.  RONALD DWORKIN, 
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 1 (2000). 
46 This formulation is based off of John Rawls’s writings.  JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 14-15 (2001).  For my purpose, reasoning in either of the 
Rawlsian way or the Dworkinian way at this level of abstraction seems to lead to the same 
conclusions.  So, I do not address any possible differences between these formulations of 
Kantian political theory. 
47 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 18-19 (1993). 
48 Id. at 30-31. 
49 Id. at 19. 
   50 These are some of the restraints on what free and equal individuals may choose as fair 
terms based on Rawls’s construct of the veil of ignorance.  Id. at 304-309. 
51 This claim is normative; it does not deny that the social shapes the individual as 
feminists have pointed out.  Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION 204 (1979). 
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their life plans on fair terms.52  The domain of the individual is the domain 
of permissible actions, as a matter of political justice, that individuals may 
do without having to take into consideration how those actions may affect 
other individuals or society as a whole.53  For example, an individual should 
be able to believe what she finds persuasive even if those beliefs are 
unpopular or disappoint others.  Allowing the individual to believe as she 
wants facilitates her forming and affirming her own life plan.  The domain 
of the individual must be expansive enough to allow for a broad range of 
life plans.  Having an expansive domain of the individual where an 
individual may permissibly form and pursue her life plan reflects the free 
aspect of the free and equal person.54 
Despite being free to pursue a life plan, an individual may not pursue 
just any life plan.  An individual may not permissibly pursue being a serial 
murderer because it substantially interferes with other individuals pursuing 
their life plans.  Moreover, an individual may not pursue a permissible life 
plan by impermissible means.  An individual cannot permissibly secure, as 
part of her life plan, home ownership by defrauding a seller of a home.  To 
establish and enforce the fair terms upon which individuals may pursue 
their life plans, the free and equal person would choose to have in a political 
structure a separate normative domain, the domain of the social.   
The domain of the social includes what government can, cannot, and 
must do with regard to persons as well as specifies what individuals can, 
should not, and must do with regard to other individuals or the government.  
For example, the government should not force someone to testify against 
herself in a criminal trial.  An individual should not take another person’s 
bicycle without permission except perhaps in extreme situations.  Choosing 
a domain of social rules that govern the fair terms reflects the free and equal 
person’s desire to be equal. 
Putting these two parts together, the free and equal person would choose 
a normative political division between what society (government or other 
individuals) may do to a person and the individual’s claim to a domain of 
her life where she is free from any requirements to do things for the 
                                                 
52 I am indebted to Arthur Ripstein for identifying the importance of this division for 
assigning accident costs.  Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of 
Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004). 
53 I say ‘as a matter of political justice’ because I am only including those actions that 
society or government should not require of its population.  I mean to exclude those actions 
that may be required by interpersonal morality because I am focusing on the relationship 
between the individual and the society and the relationship between individuals qua 
citizens of a coercive social structure. 
54 Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1811 (2004). 
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government or for other persons.  We need not search for objections to this 
normative division because I think most would agree that Kantian political 
theory requires this kind of division.55  Theorists may disagree on the exact 
contours of the social domain and the individual domain, but they 
acknowledge the normative division in some form as part of Kantian 
political theory.56  
The normative domain of the society and the domain of the individual 
do not merely determine what each respectively may and may not 
permissibly do.  The domains also include what the individual is 
responsible for and what society is responsible for, as indicated by the 
‘must’ in the above formulations.  As part of the social domain, the 
government creates the fair terms of social cooperation by doing such things 
as forming laws and institutions, regulating transactions between 
individuals, and providing public goods.  By establishing the fair terms of 
interactions, the government makes possible various life plans that 
individuals may pursue within that structure.  The structure also indicates to 
individuals what their fair share of resources (including wealth) is and 
allows them to plan their lives based on their expected fair share of 
resources. 
In the domain of the individual, the responsibility of each individual is 
to create her determinate life plan based on what she can realistically expect 
as her fair share of resources.57  In pursuing her life plan, the individual is 
responsible for obeying the fair terms of cooperation that govern the 
conditions in which she and others can pursue their determinate life plans.58 
Kantian political theory provides a way to assess theories of assigning 
accident costs.  The most persuasive theory of assigning accident costs is 
the one that free and equal persons would choose as part of the fair terms of 
social cooperation.  Such a theory would be the best interpretation of 
Kantian political theory on the issue of assigning accident costs.  In the next 
                                                 
55 See for example, Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004). 
56 One can see an example of this kind of issue in the disagreement between Rawlsians 
and G.A. Cohen regarding extent to which individual choices about their salary or their 
occupation are subject to the demands of social justice.  See G.A. COHEN, RESCUING 
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY Chpts. 4-5 (2008). 
57 John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 165-
169 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds., 1982).  See Ripstein’s account of these ideas.  Arthur 
Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 
(2004). 
58 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (1993). 
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section, I examine whether rights-based theories that are inspired by social 
utility theory are good interpretations of Kantian political theory. 
IV. Rights-based Versions of Social Utility Theories 
A. Negligence as Narrow Utilitarianism 
I start with a theory of negligence that is not obviously a rights-based 
theory.  When properly distinguished from what I call ‘general 
utilitarianism’ narrow utilitarianism can be construed as a rights-based 
theory of negligence or, at least, a mixed theory.  The narrow utilitarian 
concept of negligence states that an actor is negligent if she did not employ 
all cost-justified precautions in her act that led to the accident.  Cost-
justified precautions are precautions that cost less than the cost of the 
probable harms that could be avoided by the precaution.  If an actor is 
negligent, then she should be assigned the accident costs of the other parties 
to the accident assuming that the other parties were not negligent.  One way 
to formulate narrow utilitarianism as a rights-based theory is: 
Each person has a right to be compensated if harmed from another’s 
act that failed to take all cost-justified precautions. 
For example, to reduce the errors in surgery, medical providers could 
write on the body of the patient with a marker indicating what is to be done 
and what is not to be done.  Suppose this precaution costs $100 per patient.  
If employing this precaution of body writing avoided less than $100 worth 
of harm taking into account the probability of such harm, then the 
precaution would not be cost-justified.  If the precaution could avoid more 
than $100 of harm, then the precaution on surgery patients is cost justified.  
Assuming body writing is cost justified, then a medical provider that did not 
do it would be negligent and be assigned the costs of any resulting harm 
from the misplaced surgery. 
Narrow utilitarianism is a form of Learned Hand-style reasoning.59  The 
law and economics paradigm often states this conception of negligence in 
terms of a formula.60  A person is negligent when the burden of a possible 
precaution (B) was less than (<) the probable loss (PL).61  A person is not 
negligent if, for all relevant precautions, B>PL.  If no party to an accident 
was negligent in their act that led to the accident, then each party bears the 
costs she incurred from the accident.  Narrow utilitarianism does not 
                                                 
59 Other forms of Learned Hand-style reasoning reflect costs and benefits in other terms. 
60 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32 
(1972).   
61 Id. at 32.  Note that we are analyzing the ex ante choice.  So, there is uncertainty where 
the benefit or loss will occur and how much that benefit or loss will be. 
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concern itself with the administration costs of the tort legal system in 
determining negligence just like judges do not look at the cost of 
adjudication in determining whether a particular speech act is protected by 
the First Amendment.  These administration costs are part of the cost of 
government protecting the rights of individuals.  
Narrow utilitarianism is narrow because it does not look beyond the 
individuals involved, the kinds of actions they did, and their possible 
precautions to determine who should bear the costs of the accident.62  A 
wider approach ‘general utilitarianism’ would assign accident costs in 
whatever way minimizes the sum of accident costs and administration costs 
of dealing with the assignment of accident costs.63  Since general 
utilitarianism aims to minimize accident costs and administration costs, 
general utilitarianism is not constrained by requirements of direct causation 
or outcome responsibility because administration costs for determining such 
issues could be costly.  To save administration costs of lengthy trials, 
general utilitarianism could require assigning accident costs to all members 
of society through social tort insurance.  Another example is that general 
utilitarianism could require assigning accident costs to individuals not 
involved in certain accidents such as a third party who is the cheapest-cost-
avoider of such accidents to incentivize similar third parties to intervene in 
the future to prevent such accidents.64 
Another reason narrow utilitarianism is not general utilitarianism relates 
to the acts of the parties involved.65  The general utilitarian is not only 
concerned with minimizing accident costs and administration of accident 
costs, but she is also concerned with how much utility individuals are 
producing by their acts.66  So, the general utilitarian would also evaluate 
whether the individuals involved in the accident should have engaged in 
entirely different acts rather than merely assessing whether the individuals 
engaged in all cost-justified precautions for the kind of act they did.   
                                                 
62 Richard Posner’s claim about utilitarian or economic interpretation of negligence in 
tort began as a descriptive claim.  Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 THE 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32-34 (1972).  Posner thinks that courts have been using a 
utilitarian-type economic analysis to determine whether or not an act is negligent.  Posner 
at 34.  In contrast, I take the utilitarian form of negligence as normative.       
63 Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 743. 
64 Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 85n21 (1975-1976). 
65 Narrow utilitarianism may have a limited scope in other ways.  It may not seek to 
convert strict liability into the negligence standard.  Neither need it seek to apply 
utilitarianism in any other legal domain. 
66 I am not claiming any theorist of accident law has espoused this view.  Rather, this 
view results from a whole scale commitment to utilitarianism. 
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To illustrate, suppose two car drivers collide.  The narrow utilitarian 
would ask whether each driver took all cost justified precautions related to 
driving in those circumstances to determine if either driver was negligent.  
In contrast, the general utilitarian would also ask whether either driver 
could have maximized utility by staying home, walking, taking public 
transit, bicycling, moving closer to one’s regular destinations, and 
numerous other alternatives to driving that day for that purpose.  If so, then 
the utilitarian could condemn as negligent one or both of these drivers even 
if their driving considered alone involved all cost justified precautions 
related to driving.   
How the general utilitarian would assign accident costs from the 
accident would depend on a number of factors.  For example, did one or 
both individuals maximize utility by driving in that instance for that 
purpose?  What other options were available to incentivize these individuals 
and others to choose the act (possibly not driving at all) that would 
maximize utility in the future?  What institutional structure for assigning 
accident costs maximizes the net utility of the individuals involved?  The 
general utilitarian could consider many other possible issues as they relate 
to social utility.   
To repeat for emphasis, the general utilitarian would assess whether the 
actors should have engaged in entirely different actions rather than only the 
more limited inquiry of whether the actors employed all cost justified 
precautions.  To my knowledge, this implication of general utilitarianism 
has not been noted by accident law theorists.  However, it follows directly 
from the general utilitarian’s commitment to maximize social utility. 
So far, I have merely stated what negligence is according to narrow 
utilitarianism and contrasted it with (a non-rights-based theory) general 
utilitarianism.  As stated, narrow utilitarianism does not suffer from the first 
problem with rights-based theories, the problem of offering incomplete 
criteria for assigning accident costs.  Ignoring measurement problems, 
narrow utilitarianism provides clear enough criteria to assign accident costs. 
Narrow utilitarianism, as a rights-based theory, struggles with the 
second problem, justification.  The most straightforward justification for 
narrow utilitarianism might appear to be utilitarian moral theory 
(utilitarianism, for short). 67  Put roughly, utilitarianism requires individuals 
to maximize net social utility (happiness or something similar) because 
                                                 
67 Narrow utilitarianism could be justified as a pragmatic approach to law.  Richard 
Posner may advocate such.  See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism To Offer Law?, 
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1663 (1990).  
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utility is the highest human good.  Utilitarianism is usually the justification 
for general utilitarianism.   
Since narrow utilitarianism conflicts with general utilitarianism, narrow 
utilitarianism cannot be justified by the same justification as general 
utilitarianism.  Narrow utilitarianism does not assess whether individuals 
involved in the accident maximized utility compared to other kinds of acts.  
Also, narrow utilitarianism accepts the responsibility constraints of direct 
causation and outcome responsibility.  These responsibility constraints 
prevent narrow utilitarianism from maximizing utility because it forecloses 
alternative bearers of accident costs other than those involved in the 
accident.  Thus, narrow utilitarianism must find its justification from 
somewhere other than utilitarian moral theory. 
Another possible justification of narrow utilitarianism is Kantian 
political theory.  Narrow utilitarianism could embody what it means to treat 
individuals as free and equal persons for assigning accident costs.  Narrow 
utilitarianism seems to treat others as free (in a moral sense) because it does 
not require that individuals maximize utility in all of their acts (as general 
utilitarianism does).  So, narrow utilitarianism seems to allow expansive 
space for individuals to pursue their life plans without having to twist their 
life plans into the straightjacket of what best benefits society.  This aspect 
of narrow utilitarianism addresses the free aspect of Kantian political 
theory.   
Narrow utilitarianism seems to treat individuals as equals because it 
does not evaluate the acts of individuals in terms of certain kinds of acts 
that are better or worse pursuits.  Instead, narrow utilitarianism only looks 
at the costs of precautions for an act and compares them to the costs of 
possible harms.  On a per unit basis, a unit of precaution and a unit of harm 
count the same for each individual and each act, making narrow 
utilitarianism seem to treat each individual’s pursuits equally.  By not 
prejudging kinds of acts and by comparing acts based on units of cost that 
are the same for everyone, narrow utilitarianism seems to reflect what it 
means to treat everyone as equal in Kantian political theory. 
In fact, I think, for the reasons stated above, narrow utilitarianism is a 
plausible interpretation of Kantian political theory.  To repeat from above, 
the right would be, Each person has a right to be compensated if harmed 
from another’s act that failed to take all cost-justified precautions.  While 
narrow utilitarianism is a plausible rights-based interpretation of Kantian 
political morality, I do not think it is the best interpretation.   
The first shortcoming is that narrow utilitarianism does not evaluate the 
worth of the purpose of an act.  Narrow utilitarianism is blind to the purpose 
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of an act insofar as it only looks at the costs of precaution and the costs of 
possible harm.  Earlier I described this aspect of narrow utilitarianism as a 
good attribute of the theory, an attribute that may satisfy the moral 
requirement to treat persons as equals.  However, the problem of not 
including some evaluation of the purpose of the act is that the interests of 
the potential harmed are not given equal weight.  For instance, individuals 
can be subjected to risks from acts that have trivial value (trivial acts, for 
short).  Since narrow utilitarianism exposes individuals to harm from trivial 
acts without the possibility of compensation, narrow utilitarianism fails to 
adequately treat those exposed to harm from trivial acts as equals. 
Borrowing an example from Gregory Keating, consider an ambulance 
driver who is rushing a critically ill patient to a hospital.68  The ambulance 
driver is taking all cost justified precautions.  Since the patient faces serious 
disability or death without urgent hospital care, narrow utilitarianism 
justifies that the ambulance driver can drive fast (up to a point) despite the 
risk of harm posed to pedestrians and other motorists.  In contrast, consider 
a car full of beach enthusiasts rushing to the beach.  The beach goers are 
quite anxious to get to the beach for various reasons (important to the beach 
goers) such as making it in time for the barbecue and catching the waves 
before dark.  The road to the beach has only a few other vehicles.  Since the 
beach enthusiasts have so much to lose by driving slower and the road has 
few other vehicles, the driver of the beach enthusiasts is cost justified in 
driving quite fast to the beach.   
Suppose accidents occurred from the driving of both the ambulance and 
the beach enthusiasts.  Narrow utilitarianism would find the drivers not at 
fault (negligent) because both drivers took all cost justified precautions.  
This implication disturbs me.  Since beach going is a form of leisure (for 
most beach goers), traveling to the beach is not important enough to require 
that individuals only take cost justified precautions.69  When engaged in 
leisure acts, we would want individuals to take more precaution than what is 
cost justified to reflect this evaluation of the act.  At the same time, getting 
the injured to the hospital is a highly valuable act.  Putting these together, 
even though both drivers took all cost justified precautions, we may 
disagree with the narrow utilitarian by adjudging that the ambulance driver 
was not at fault and that the beach driver was at fault.  In so doing, the 
ambulance driver would not be assigned the costs for her accident whereas 
the beach driver would be assigned the costs for his accident.   
                                                 
68 Gregory Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STANFORD 
L. REV. 311, 324-25 (1996). 
69 Keating seems to mean something similar by stating beach-going is a “trivial end.”  
Keating at 325. 
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Free and equal persons would not want to be subject to risks just 
because they are cost-justified.  It is true that free and equal persons have 
interests in pursuing their chosen acts and so would want wide latitude in 
what acts they can pursue without being subject to bearing the costs of any 
resulting accidents.  However, free and equal persons do not want to be 
subject to risks of harm for purposes that are not valuable enough (trivial 
acts).  Instead, we need a compromise between allowing an individual the 
freedom to pursue the acts that she wants and the interests that those subject 
to risk have of being free non-compensable harm from trivial acts.   
The advocate of narrow utilitarianism may think that the value of the 
purposes of the act can be factored into the test advocated by narrow 
utilitarianism.  While the value of the purposes of an act could be factored 
into some equation to determine liability, that revised equation would no 
longer be narrow utilitarianism as it is usually presented.  Additionally, any 
attempt to put the costs of bodily injury into a formula that weighs it 
mathematically against other costs fails to capture that most individuals 
would prefer no injury at all to having been injured and compensated. 
Those who advocate narrow utilitarianism do not include the evaluation 
of the act in the equation.  They may exclude it because they think that 
leaving it out treats equally each person’s interests in pursuing their own 
acts.  However, they neglect the interests that the potential harmed have in 
not being subject to non-compensable harm for trivial acts.  Neglecting this 
aspect fails to treat equally those subject to risks because it gives 
individuals too wide of discretion in imposing risks on others.   
B.  Rights-Based Social Welfare Theory  
Some may think that a social welfare test similar to what is advocated 
by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell would solve the problem of trivial acts 
that I leveled against narrow utilitarianism.70  In fact, Kaplow and Shavell 
go to the opposite extreme.  Their theory includes, insofar as it affects the 
preferences of individuals, the value of anything involved in the accident 
and in the administration of assigning accident costs.71  Their theory sums 
up all the various preferences that are satisfied by each option of assigning 
accident costs to determine which option maximizes the (weighted) 
preferences of all involved.  Kaplow and Shavell only exclude in their 
social welfare theory under the title of ‘fairness’ those considerations that 
do not affect preference satisfaction at all.72  The right espoused by the 
rights-based social welfare theory would be the right to compensation for 
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harm from an act that does not comport with the social welfare regime that 
maximizes utility. 
A rights-based social welfare theory may seem to have a way to avoid 
the problem of narrow utilitarianism in the beach enthusiasts case.  Social 
welfare theory does so by weighting lower the welfare from beach going 
than the welfare from ambulance driving.  By reducing the welfare of beach 
going through weighting it differently, the precaution needed to avoid 
liability for such acts is greater than required by narrow utilitarianism.  So 
modified, social welfare theory would still require cost-justified 
precautions, but by weighting lower the beach going act than other more 
valuable acts, greater precaution is required to make beach going cost 
justified.   
Rights-based social welfare theory is afflicted with the first problem of 
rights-based theories, the problem of incompleteness.  In fact, social welfare 
theory fails to answer an issue key to its own formulation.  That key issue is 
how much should each act be weighted.73  Social welfare theory tells us to 
pursue the option that gives the highest social welfare once the acts are 
weighted.  However, social welfare theory does not tell us how to weight 
each act.74  The rights-based social welfare theory considered above has no 
determinate content without some theory that persuasively weights the 
factors in the function.  Thus, without content, social welfare theory is not a 
viable theory of assigning accident costs.  To that extent, we do not need to 
and are perhaps unable to consider whether the rights-based social welfare 
theory has a defensible justification. 
So far, I have considered rights-based theories that have their theoretical 
origins in utilitarian theory but were modified to express rights-based 
theories.  Not surprisingly, these theories are deficient expressions of 
Kantian political theory because they are incomplete or fail to evaluate the 
acts involved in a persuasive or justifiable way.  I will now turn to theories 
that seek to express Kantian political theory as it applies to assigning 
accident costs. 
V.  Kantian Rights-based Theories 
A. Weinrib’s Corrective Justice Theory 
Ernest Weinrib provides a distinctly Kantian account of tort law by 
arguing that tort law’s characteristics reflect the moral dimensions of the 
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Kantian commitment to liberty.75  Weinrib’s theory emphasizes the bilateral 
nature of tort law’s institutional structure to argue that tort law’s purpose is 
to right the person wronged when that wrong led to an accident.76   
Regarding the central normative concern, Weinrib endorses what he 
terms the “English and Commonwealth” approach to reasonable care.77  In 
contrast to narrow utilitarianism, Weinrib claims that the English and 
Commonwealth approach ignores “almost completely” the burden of 
precaution for reducing risk.78  Instead, this approach focuses on the risk of 
harm and the magnitude of the harm that is risked to determine if an actor 
was negligent.79   
Weinrib outlines two parts to the English and Commonwealth approach.  
First, the approach determines whether the risk was reasonably foreseeable 
in the sense that “there is a threshold degree of risk that a reasonable person 
ought not to ignore.”80  Only if this threshold is met does the English and 
Commonwealth approach address the burden of the precaution issue, 
according to Weinrib, although the details of this aspect need not concern 
us.  Second, if the risk exceeds the threshold degree of risk that a reasonable 
person ought not to ignore, “it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine 
what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk.”81  In other 
words, the trial court determines whether the risky act was reasonable to 
take under the circumstances. 
While Weinrib provides criteria for analyzing the concept of reasonable 
care, he does not offer enough criteria.  His theory does not offer 
determinate answers to specific cases to the central normative concern.  At 
both steps in the English and Commonwealth approach, Weinrib leaves 
some form of the term ‘reasonable’ in the criteria.  Weinrib does not tell us 
either how much risk meets the initial threshold for it to be unreasonable to 
ignore or how to determine that amount of risk.  He also does not tell us 
how a tribunal should decide whether a risky act that passed the first-stage 
threshold was reasonable or not.  In the end, Weinrib’s theory contains a 
gap.  Weinrib needs to fill this gap to have a determinate theory of assigning 
accidents.   
                                                 
75 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 84 (1995).  Weinrib often speaks of 
private law in general.  By inference, here and elsewhere I take his claims to apply to tort 
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Like the rights-based social welfare theory, Weinrib’s theory suffers 
from the problem of incompleteness.  Without being complete, we need not 
and cannot assess its justification for how it addresses the central normative 
concern.  Hence, Weinrib’s theory does not provide an adequate rights-
based theory of assigning accident costs. 
B. Ripstein’s Freedom and Security 
Arthur Ripstein advances a theory of responsibility for accident costs 
within Kantian political theory.82  He seems to be focusing exclusively on 
explaining and justifying tort law as found in its extant institutional 
setting.83  For my purposes, I focus only on the part of his theory about what 
constitutes the standard of care for negligence in tort law, which is roughly 
the same issue as the central normative concern.  Ripstein argues that 
determining negligence involves “weighing liberty against security” within 
the construct of the reasonable person.  For Ripstein, the reasonable person 
“moderates his or her actions in light of the legitimate claims of others.”84  
However, Ripstein does not state how to weigh liberty against security 
or what specifically are the legitimate claims of others.  He uses phrases 
such as “appropriate care”85 to describe the amount of precaution needed 
and “undue risk” to describe a risk that inappropriately weighs liberty 
against security.  Yet, he never fleshes out the details of what is appropriate 
care or what is undue risk, seeming to leave such decisions to courts 
without further guidance.86   
At one point, Ripstein states, “specific liberty interests and security 
interests are protected, based on a conception of their importance to leading 
an autonomous life.”87  However, Ripstein does not provide us that 
conception.  Furthermore, it is not clear how reasoning about the 
importance of liberty and security interests to autonomy is going to get us 
enough detail to make the highly detailed decisions about whether acts, that 
Ripstein describes as “activities in contexts,” are reasonable.88  Later, 
Ripstein does point out that customary risks will often coincide with 
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appropriate risks and undue risks.89  However, he does not flesh out the 
importance of this coincidence or how to determine when customary risks 
do not coincide with appropriate risks. 
As a result, Ripstein’s theory does not go far enough in addressing the 
central normative concern.  Ripstein adds something to the reasonable 
person theory by pointing out two key interests that concern the reasonable 
person.  However, he does not provide enough criteria to determine how 
these further interests of security and liberty are to be justifiably weighed.  
Thus, Ripstein’s theory lacks the specificity needed to determine the actual 
results of how to justifiably assign costs of particular accidents.  Due to the 
incompleteness of Ripstein’s theory, it does not offer a viable rights-based 
theory on the issue of the central normative concern. 
On behalf of Ripstein, we could try to fill out how to trade off the 
interests of security and liberty by appealing to moral intuition or to ideal or 
actual deliberative procedures.  The appeal to moral intuition to fill out the 
balancing of the interests of security and liberty is unsatisfying because it 
does not solve the problem of when moral intuitions conflict within an 
individual and between individuals.  Moral intuition is also problematic 
because it seems to reify the status quo view of risks under the auspices of 
objective moral truth.   
If Ripstein’s theory were to spell out how the reasonable person would 
balance liberty and security by appealing to actual deliberative procedures, 
his theory would gain the specificity needed.  However, under such an 
interpretation, Ripstein’s identification of liberty and security does not seem 
to add much to a theory that uses actual deliberative procedures especially 
when these procedures could include more values than liberty and security. 
If Ripstein’s theory were fleshed out in terms of ideal deliberative 
procedures, such is difficult to evaluate without a concrete theory before us.  
General values such as liberty and security do not obviously lead to any 
particular conclusions about concrete risks.  Spelling out how to balance 
interests of security and liberty in an ideal deliberative procedure seems 
unable to provide enough detail without a substantial addition of content to 
the theory. 
As a result, we have no persuasive way to fix the incompleteness of 
Ripstein’s theory.  Like the other incomplete theories above, we need not 
and cannot assess the justification for Ripstein’s theory.  So far, none of the 
rights-based theories considered provide an adequate answer to the central 
normative concern.     
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C. Fletcher’s Reciprocal Risk Theory 
George Fletcher claims that Kantian political theory would accord each 
person the maximum amount of security compatible with the same amount 
of security for everyone else.90  In this claim, Fletcher is trying to follow 
John Rawls’s emphasis on reciprocity.91  So, I refer to Fletcher’s theory as 
‘reciprocal risk theory.’  Put abstractly, if person X in a given interaction 
imposes more risk on person Y than person Y is imposing on X (in other 
words, if their mutual risk imposition is asymmetrical), then person X (the 
person imposing the greater risk) owes compensation to person Y if harm 
occurs.  Fletcher thinks that according each individual reciprocal security 
(and risk) in this manner treats individuals as free and equal. 
I think that reciprocal risk theory embodies a tension.  Stephen Perry 
identifies this tension while pursuing a different tack, to wit, a theory of 
outcome responsibility.92  To make this tension more explicit, I argue that 
reciprocal risk theory has two conflicting components.  The first component 
compares the magnitude of the risks of each party’s act to assign accident 
costs.  The party that imposed the greater amount of risk on the other is 
liable for any harm that occurred to the other party.93  I call this ‘component 
A’ of reciprocal risk theory.   
Component A is the most obvious from Fletcher’s text.  Component A 
explains why strict liability is used for excessively risky acts such as crop 
dusting and blasting.  The magnitude of the risks of these acts virtually 
always exceeds the risks of the acts of those harmed.  Fletcher also uses 
component A to determine negligence liability when two people are 
engaged in the same kind of act.94  He writes, “Negligently created risks are 
nonreciprocal relative to the risks generated by the drivers and ballplayers 
who engage in the same activity in the customary way.”95   All parties are 
not negligent when they engage in the same act in the ordinary way, such as 
when they are engaged in “ordinary driving.”96   Thus, component A can 
explain pockets of strict liability if one individual is engaged in a drastically 
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91 Fletcher at 550. Fletcher does not phrase his theory as based in Kantian political 
theory, but I think that is where his theory is best placed based on his reliance on John 
Rawls’s work.   
   92 Perry at 117-18. 
93 Id. at 548. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 547-48. 
 
30  Rights-based Theories of Accident Law 
more risky act as well as negligence if individuals are engaged in the same 
act.97      
‘Component B’ of the reciprocal risk theory is hard to disentangle from 
Fletcher’s writing because Fletcher sees component A and component B as 
overlapping or virtually the same.  Since I see component B as distinct and 
in tension with component A, I must convincingly extricate it from 
Fletcher’s writing.   
Component B involves Fletcher’s idea of background risks.98  
Background risks are all of the risks that accompany daily social life.99   
Fletcher includes in reciprocal risk theory how courts should assign costs 
from acts that are part of the background risk.100  Since everyone creates 
background risks, Fletcher thinks, “all members of the community 
contribute in roughly equal shares.”101  Recall Fletcher believes in the 
“principle of fairness: all individuals in society have the right to roughly the 
same degree of security from risk.”102  Since fairness or reciprocity 
demands that everyone get the same amount of security, Fletcher reasons 
that no one needs to be compensated when an accident results from 
background risks.103  Background risks are the risks that individuals must 
bear without compensation “as part of group living.”104    
Fletcher provides an example, “If we all drive, we must suffer the costs 
of ordinary driving.”105  From this example, we see that background risks 
are acts that all (or perhaps most) people do in the manner that all (or most) 
people do them.  Component B is used when two parties to an accident are 
engaged in different kinds of acts that are both background risks.  
Component B does not look at whether one party actually imposed greater 
risk on the other.  Instead, since both acts are background risks, their actual 
degrees of risk are not examined.  Component B considers them as having 
the same level of risk for the purpose of assigning accident costs (even if in 
reality one background risk was riskier than the other).  Since the risk 
imposition is symmetrical, neither party owes the other compensation. 
I contend that component A of reciprocal risk theory is in tension with 
component B.  Component A assigns accident costs based on the actual risk 
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imposed by the acts.  In contrast, component B ignores the actual risks of 
the acts and instead assigns accident costs based on what role (common or 
uncommon) that kind of act plays in the society.  Thus, the two components 
to reciprocal risk theory use different criteria to assign accident costs. 
The result of these two components of reciprocal risk theory using 
different criteria is that they may assign accident costs differently for the 
same case.  For example, suppose a person engaged in ordinary driving gets 
into an accident with a person engaged in ordinary walking.106  Component 
A would require the ordinary driver to compensate the ordinary walker 
because the former imposed a comparatively higher risk on the latter.  
However, component B would not require compensation from either party 
because both were engaged in background risks.  Thus, the problem with 
reciprocal risk theory is that it has two components that assign accident 
costs in conflicting ways. 
Fletcher may first respond by claiming that component A and 
component B actually overlap such that there is no tension between them.  
The key passage states, “If uncommon activities are those with few 
participants, they are likely to be activities generating nonreciprocal 
risks.”107   Fletcher thinks that the domain of uncommon acts (non-
background risks) will be coextensive with acts that are an order of 
magnitude of risk different from common risks.  Stating the overlap from 
the other direction, Fletcher writes,  
Similarly, dangerous activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop 
dusting stand out as distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the community.  
They represent threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to which 
all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares.108    
So, component A is all that Fletcher seems to want to use.  Since 
nonreciprocal risks impose an uncommon amount of risk, all nonreciprocal 
risks are in that sense non-background risks.  In sum, for Fletcher, since 
uncommon risks are coextensive with nonreciprocal risks and common risks 
are coextensive with reciprocal risks, then the two components I identify 
collapse into component A, which compares the actual risks of the acts to 
assign accident costs. 
In response to Fletcher’s attempt to unify component A and component 
B, I only need to show that component A does not handle adequately at 
least some accidents involving two background risks.  These cases involve 
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two acts that are both common and one clearly imposes more risk on the 
other (in the sense important to component A).   
Return to the case of the ordinary walker and ordinary driver.109  
Ordinary driving imposes a greater risk than ordinary walking indicating 
that component A would determine that the ordinary driver should 
compensate the ordinary walker.  However, ordinary driving and ordinary 
walking are both background risks.  In such cases, component B requires 
that neither party owes the other compensation.  To arrive at that conclusion 
component A would have to ignore the obvious disparity in the risks of 
these ordinary acts.  But, ignoring such goes against the motivating idea 
behind component A.  So, reciprocal risk theory requires two conflicting 
assignments of costs for the same accident.   
In a footnote, Fletcher mentions the case of the ordinary walker and 
driver.  He states that these cases “require further thought.”110   Fletcher 
thinks that these cases do not pose a significant problem because they are at 
the “fringes” of reciprocal risk theory.111  
These cases seem hardly at the fringes.  The numbers of accidents that 
result from people engaging in common acts involving significantly 
different amounts of risk are numerous.  Even if only some of these 
common acts with different risks have as large of a disparity of risk as 
driving and walking, Fletcher does not tell us why we should ignore smaller 
differences.   
In reality, common acts have risks that are large (driving), medium 
(bicycling), and small (walking).  Although cumbersome, even more 
realistic would be recognizing that background risks lie on a continuum 
from most risky to least risky.  If Fletcher wants all individuals to have the 
same amount of security, we should be concerned about making these 
distinctions even if the acts are common or ordinary.  If so, then the types of 
accidents resulting from two ordinary acts with different amounts of risk are 
not “fringe” cases that can be saved for later.  Instead, they are going to 
comprise a significant portion of accidents.  If reciprocal risk theory 
addresses these cases, it swallows the tension I have identified between 
component A and component B.  If reciprocal risk theory does not address 
these cases, then it is unable to completely handle all kinds of accidents.   
Furthermore, there are cases where uncommon acts are not riskier than 
common acts.  Suppose that a person is sword swallowing when she gets 
into an accident with an ordinary walker.  While sword swallowing is 
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dangerous for the individual doing the swallowing, this uncommon act does 
not seem more harmful to other people than walking or many other 
common acts.   
In such a case, we see a tension in reciprocal risk theory.  Component A 
would determine no liability based on the similarity of risks to others 
between sword swallowing and ordinary walking.  However, since sword 
swallowing is uncommon, it would not be a background risk indicating that 
the sword swallower should compensate the ordinary walker.  The way to 
explain these diverging liability determinations is by acknowledging the 
two components of reciprocal risk theory.  At the same time, we see that 
these two components are in tension because they lead to two conflicting 
ways to assign accident costs for the same case.   
One way to resolve this tension is for reciprocal risk theory to assign 
each component to distinct kinds of accidents.  The tension would not arise 
because the two components would never be applied to the same kind of 
accident.  While such a resolution would eliminate the tension between the 
two components in reciprocal risk theory, I see no way to justify assigning 
component A exclusively to certain kinds of acts while assigning 
component B exclusively to different kinds of acts.   
Another possible resolution to the tension is to make component B 
concerned with actual risk over complete lives rather than about the specific 
acts that lead to an accident.  Fletcher seems to suggest that if Jack walks 
while Jill bicycles one day, they are in a reciprocal relationship because 
another day Jill walks and Jack bicycles.112   Or, even if Jack does not 
bicycle, he may do some other act that imposes the same level of risk on Jill 
such as playing football.113  By not requiring compensation for all acts that 
are background risks, component B focuses on individuals imposing 
(roughly) the same amount of risk on each other over complete lives.   
Under this resolution, both components of reciprocal risk theory are 
concerned about actual risk but they differ on the timeframe in which they 
measure actual risk.  Component A looks only at the acts that lead to the 
accident in question whereas component B looks at the aggregate risk over 
a complete life to balance out disparities in discrete cases of risk imposition. 
The first problem with this attempt at resolving the tension is that the 
two components still would conflict with each other on whether to require 
liability in specific cases.  Without independent reasons to treat an accident 
as one where we should take the lifelong view versus the immediate view, 
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the two components would still recommend different assignments of 
accident costs in some cases.   
The lifelong approach to assigning accident costs (a supposed version of 
component B) is an appealing interpretation of Fletcher because it coheres 
well with the Rawlsian rationale that animates his theory.  Recall that 
rationale is that each person is to be guaranteed equal amounts of 
security.114  Compensation makes up for a person’s loss of security when 
they are harmed thereby restoring them to an equal amount of security as 
everyone else.   
The problem with this resolution is that component A and component B 
are supposed to justify a legal duty for one person to compensate another 
person for a single harmful act.  As Stephen Perry points out, the bilateral 
nature of this legal duty conflicts with the rationale that motivates Fletcher’s 
reciprocal risk theory (and my supposed version of component B).115  If 
compensation makes up for a loss of security, we would expect all 
individuals who engaged in a kind of risky act to compensate a person 
harmed not merely the one individual whose risky act happened to harm the 
person.116  A rationale that seeks to distribute security equally would be 
better suited to social tort insurance where the cost of compensating for loss 
of security (harm) is distributed among all individuals who risk others’ loss 
of security.117  So, the attempt to save Fletcher from the tension between 
component A and component B by taking a lifelong view of risk does not 
mesh with much of Fletcher’s text where he is trying to establish an 
individual’s duty to another individual to compensate for harm.  
The final problem of reformulating the reciprocal risk theory in terms of 
a lifelong distribution of equal security or risk among persons stems from 
the fact that component B does not guarantee that each individual will be 
exposed to even roughly the same amount of risk over her complete life.  
The reason is that not every individual engages in the same variety of acts 
to the same extent.  So, just because component B allows one person to 
perform the same acts (background risks) as others does not mean that each 
person will be subject to roughly the same amount of risk over a complete 
life.  The problem is that Uday always walks and may never do an act that 
counterbalances Jill’s bicycling or Jack’s football playing.  Even if Uday 
does some comparable act, he may not do it as often as others do their 
riskier acts because he spends most of his time inside his house.  
Additionally, one person’s background risk act can kill another person 
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cutting off that person’s chance to impose risks on others to counterbalance 
the risk to which he was subjected.   
Component B merely gives each person the formal or legal freedom to 
do the same acts without being assigned others’ costs from any harm.  
Component B does not guarantee that everyone will be subjected to and 
able to subject others to roughly the same amount of risk because individual 
preferences may lead them to consistently impose different levels of risk on 
each other.  We have no reason to believe that the differences would cancel 
out as we add more people into the equation.  Thus, reciprocal risk theory 
does not seem to equalize actual risks over complete lives.  So, this attempt 
to reconcile the tension between the two components of reciprocal risk 
theory fails. 
Since the tension remains, reciprocal risk theory needs to pick between 
component A and component B.  My guess is that Fletcher would pick 
component A and reject component B because component A most explicitly 
employs reciprocity, the value that Fletcher thinks animates his theory of 
tort law.   
At most, component B provides ‘legal reciprocity’ in that everyone is 
subject to the same legal rules.  However, almost any plausible regime of 
assigning accident costs will have legal reciprocity as long as accident costs 
are assigned based on the actions performed.  To that extent, component B 
of reciprocal risk theory cannot claim to embody any unique form of 
reciprocity compared to all other regimes of assigning accident costs.  
Perhaps Fletcher does not think of the reciprocity in component B as 
legal reciprocity.  Rather, perhaps he thinks that background risks are 
reciprocal because the society accepts these risks as part of the hazards of 
their way of living.  The reciprocity is that all members somehow have 
agreed that these risks are acceptable in that society.  While this 
interpretation is appealing, I see only minimal textual basis in Fletcher’s 
work that hints in this direction.    
Furthermore, a plausible conception of reciprocity based on agreement 
to a regime of risk does not seem open to Fletcher because he does not place 
any requirements on how the accepted regime of background risks is 
established.  If background risks are just what individuals do on a consistent 
basis, then stronger individuals or special interest groups would be able to 
unfairly impose their preferred risks as part of the background risks.  If 
others have no say in what risks others can impose, not only is an agreement 
on the regime of risks unlikely but also reciprocity seems nowhere to be 
found.  Since Fletcher does not have limitations on the way that background 
risks are determined in a society, he does not seem to establish that 
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component B is justified by a form reciprocity based on agreement on 
acceptable risks. 
Even if Fletcher goes this direction with component B, the tension still 
exists between component A and component B (and mere legal reciprocity).  
The new interpretation of component B rests on most individuals in a 
community agreeing in some sense to a certain regime of risks.  Component 
A does not appeal to any sense of agreement since it only looks at whether 
individuals actually impose the same risks on each other.  Since a 
community can agree that unequal risk impositions of certain kinds should 
be free from liability, the tension between component B with this new 
interpretation and component A of reciprocal risk theory remains.   
No other plausible interpretation of component B seems to be able to 
employ the same sense of reciprocity as component A.  So, in the end, 
Fletcher equivocates on reciprocity in component A and in component B.  
Since I take Fletcher to primarily be advocating for the sense of reciprocity 
imbued in component A of reciprocal risk theory, I conclude that Fletcher 
would excise component B.   
Unfortunately, component A by itself is not an appealing theory of 
assigning accident costs.  One measurement problem with such a theory is 
that we do not have a persuasive way to compare the magnitude of risks 
between different acts when those risks are not clearly far apart on the risk 
spectrum.  Whether walking while texting is riskier than playing Frisbee is 
difficult to tell. 
A bigger problem is that assigning accident costs according to 
component A alone provides uncertainty.  Whether one person is acting 
safely enough to avoid being assigned another’s accident costs depends on 
what the other person who happens to be harmed is doing.  A standard of 
care that is such a moving target would make it difficult for individuals to 
plan appropriately including buying appropriate levels of insurance.  Such a 
regime would burden individuals’ freedom to engage in acts they deem 
valuable.  Thus, component A alone does not seem to be a good 
interpretation of what it means to treat a person as free according to Kantian 
political morality. 
Component A alone would also favor individuals who prefer acts with 
low risk.  Individuals with low risk preferences would likely be able to get 
the costs of their accidents assigned to the other person involved in the 
accident.  Such an advantage for individuals with low risk preferences does 
not treat persons as equal according to Kantian political morality. 
In summary, Fletcher’s theory of reciprocal risk is inadequate either 
because its parts conflict or because its foremost part (component A) is not 
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a satisfying interpretation of Kantian political theory.  Reciprocal risk 
theory does not provide us with an adequate rights-based theory of 
assigning accident costs.  
D. Perry’s Accepted Pattern of Social Interaction 
In critiquing Fletcher’s theory, Stephen Perry suggests his own theory of 
assigning accident costs.  He writes, “the materialization of a risk that is 
normally incident to an accepted pattern of social interaction will not give 
rise to liability.”118  By this statement, Perry means that if an act of an 
individual accidentally harms another individual, the former does not have 
to compensate the latter as long as the former’s act is part of an accepted 
pattern of social interaction.  Unfortunately, Perry does not flesh out what 
he means by an ‘accepted pattern of social interaction.’   
Depending on how Perry fleshes out his theory, this theory may in fact 
accurately describe accident law doctrine.119  Regardless, Perry seems to 
suggest that he is also advancing a normative theory.120  For my purposes, I 
will assess Perry’s theory as a normative theory because only as such does it 
address the central normative concern. 
Although Perry’s theory can be a normative theory, he does not offer a 
justification for that theory.  Given that Perry suggests his theory while 
discussing Fletcher’s theory and as a possible amendment to Fletcher’s 
theory, I think it is safe to assume that Perry thinks his theory is justified 
within the Kantian rights-based tradition.  However, I do not think that 
Perry is relying on Fletcher’s principle about ensuring everyone equal 
security because Perry criticizes Fletcher’s use of what seems to be a 
principle of social distributive justice to establish a right in corrective 
justice to determine a right that would pertain only between the two parties 
in an accident.121  For Perry’s theory to be persuasive, we need a more 
detailed justification than a vague appeal to Kantian rights.  I will consider 
two possible justifications below.  
Before then, I identify some possible problems internal to Perry’s 
theory.  Perry’s theory has one of the problems I identified while trying to 
resolve the tension in Fletcher’s theory: an accepted pattern of social 
interaction may not be justifiable for assigning accident costs because of the 
                                                 
118 Id. at 119. 
119 One issue is whether the fact that, as a matter of legal doctrine, custom is not 
dispositive of the standard of care counts against Perry’s descriptive theory of this aspect of 
tort law. 
120 Perry speaks of “moral warrant” and the “proper context” for assigning accident costs.  
Perry at 115.   
121 Perry at 118. 
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way the pattern became accepted.  For example, if the society accepted an 
aspect of a pattern of interaction due to fraud, then the pattern is not a 
justifiable basis for assigning accident costs.  The fraudulent aspect of the 
pattern means that the pattern was not legitimately accepted.  Reading Perry 
charitably, we could assume that he too would invalidate aspects of a social 
pattern that were the result of fraud.  If so, then Perry needs to complete his 
theory by stating how to assign accident costs where the relevant part of the 
accepted pattern of social interaction is invalidated by fraud. 
Another problem with Perry’s theory (also identified above with 
Fletcher) is that an accepted pattern of social interaction could violate 
constitutional rights.  For instance, the accepted pattern of social interaction 
could violate the equal protection clause as it applies to race or sex.  As 
pictured in the recent movie The Help, the accepted pattern of social 
interaction prohibited African American domestic workers from entering 
the house where they worked through the front door.122  If an African 
American domestic worker slipped and fell while entering the front door of 
her employment, her violating the accepted social pattern may exonerate the 
homeowner/employer from being assigned the costs of the worker’s harm.  
Such a legal implication would violate the domestic worker’s constitutional 
right to be free from racial discrimination.   
Perry may also endorse that the accepted pattern must not violate 
constitutional rights to be legitimate as a friendly amendment.  Once again, 
he needs to spell out how to handle these sorts of cases for his theory to be 
complete and persuasive. 
Aside from these amendments for Perry’s accepted pattern theory to be 
persuasive, potential problems lurk for Perry’s theory depending on how he 
fleshes the theory out.  The problems concern the two attributes of the 
social interaction.  Perry requires the social interaction to be both accepted 
and a pattern in some sense.  Both of these attributes pose difficulties.  First, 
Perry must not mean to require unanimous acceptance.  Requiring that 
everyone accept the pattern dooms the standard to being impossible to 
satisfy.  If not unanimity, how many must accept the pattern for it to be 
legally justified?  If only a majority of the members of the society need to 
accept the pattern, how does that acceptance justify assigning accident costs 
to an individual who does not accept the pattern?   
Moving on, another problem concerns the nature of the acceptance of 
the pattern.  By ‘accepted’ does Perry require a conscious, deliberate 
avowal of the social interaction?  Such a stringent requirement may be too 
high to apply in accident cases because often many individuals in a society 
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do not consciously and deliberately consider whether to accept acts that 
could lead to harm.  At least, Perry must require that many people to have a 
pro-attitude toward the pattern of social interaction.  What about those who 
are indifferent or undecided?  What if 50% of the population has a pro-
attitude toward one pattern and the other 50% has a pro-attitude toward a 
mutually exclusive pattern?  Without answering these issues, Perry’s theory 
is incomplete. 
Potential difficulties lurk depending on what Perry means by the second 
attribute ‘pattern.’  Since Perry is speaking of what individuals are doing, he 
seems to mean by ‘pattern’ what individuals are actually doing with some 
sort of regularity.  One difficulty concerns the conflict between these two 
attributes: ‘accepted’ and ‘pattern.’  The actual pattern of social interaction 
could not be accepted, or the pattern that most people accept is not being 
done.  Suppose most individuals believe that drivers should not phone while 
driving.  Yet, most individuals including those with this belief actually 
phone while driving.  If harm results from such a scenario, Perry’s theory 
provides no answer to how to assign accident costs.   
Another difficulty with Perry’s use of ‘pattern’ concerns acts that are 
not done uniformly.  For example, suppose 15% of homeowners remove 
litter from their walkways daily, 40% do so weekly, 40% bi-weekly, and 
5% monthly or less frequently.  Is this complicated arrangement the pattern 
of social interaction?  If so, then no one ever deviates from the pattern.  
Suppose someone were to slip and fall on litter on the walkway of a house 
whose homeowner removes litter bi-weekly.  If no one is deviating from the 
(complicated, non-uniform pattern), then the homeowner whose walkway 
led to the accident met the extremely low or nonexistent standard of care.  
Pedestrians would have to walk at their own risk.  This is a curious outcome 
given that 55% of the homeowners remove their litter at least weekly.    
To avoid this problem, perhaps, Perry could appeal to which frequency 
for litter removal is accepted.  However, how people actually act is strong 
evidence of what they accept.  So, how would we determine if one of these 
frequencies is the accepted pattern of social interaction when what people 
are doing reflects no majority consensus? 
It is possible that Perry could flesh out his theory in a way that satisfies 
these concerns.  But, these concerns remain until his theory is fleshed out.  
Many of the concerns I have raised against Perry’s theory need to be 
answered by the theory that I will sketch below.  However, I believe that 
my theory persuasively answers these concerns, as I will demonstrate in a 
future piece. 
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Even if Perry can persuasively satisfy these concerns, we still lack a 
detailed justification for Perry’s theory.  Why should the accepted pattern of 
social interaction be the criterion for assigning accident costs? 
As mentioned earlier, Perry may be committed to a Kantian, rights-
based justification for his accepted pattern theory of assigning accident 
costs.  One possible version of that justification is suggested by the way 
Perry formulates his theory.  If certain acts are being done in a pattern, 
individuals have reason to rely on each other conforming to that pattern.123  
This reason is especially strong for acts where the benefits of the acts 
depend largely on everyone conforming to the pattern such as in traffic 
patterns.  Given that reliance on the pattern is reasonable (perhaps rational) 
or at least understandable, someone who deviates from that pattern (a 
deviator) wrongs another individual who is harmed by the deviating act.  
This assumes that the harmed individual was conforming to the pattern of 
social cooperation.  While not identical, the harmed’s reliance interest in the 
pattern of social interaction is similar to the reliance interest an individual 
may acquire in the realm of contract law when one relies on another’s 
promise despite the lack of contractual consideration.  The reliance on the 
pattern of social interaction seems even stronger if the pattern is accepted 
and known by everyone that it is the accepted pattern. 
While the idea of reliance can provide one reason why an accepted 
pattern of social interaction is a plausible basis for assigning accident costs, 
I do not think the justification runs deep enough into our considered 
convictions of how society should be organized to support the entire system 
of assigning accident costs.  The reliance justification does not seem to be 
able to combat the reasoning of a deviator who acts for a different yet 
laudable reason.  Suppose someone deviates from an accepted pattern of 
social interaction because doing so produces more utility.  The deviator 
claims that producing more utility justifies deviation while the harmed 
claims that reliance on the accepted pattern delegitimizes deviation.  The 
reliance theorist does not seem to have a response; the reliance theorist 
needs a more robust theory in order to overcome this possible objection by 
the deviator. 
Another shortcoming of the reliance justification is that it does not 
explain how changes to the accepted pattern of social interaction can be 
effected legitimately.  If an actual pattern of social interaction is no longer 
accepted, can one no longer rely on that pattern?  If an accepted pattern is 
no longer being followed even though it is still accepted, can one no longer 
                                                 
123 In conversation, Perry suggested this point as a possible justification for his view 
without endorsing the justification. 
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rely on that pattern?  Must one rely on a new, emerging pattern even though 
it is not accepted?  Can the government intervene to incentivize one pattern 
over another?  The reliance justification does not seem to have robust 
enough theoretical resources to provide persuasive answers to these 
questions.  The overarching problem in these questions is that the reliance 
justification does not provide justifiable mechanisms for the formation or 
change of accepted patterns of social interactions.   
Another possible version of a Kantian rights-based justification for 
Perry’s theory could be arguing that free and equal individuals in a society 
would choose the accepted pattern theory as fair terms of social 
cooperation.  In Perry’s accepted pattern theory, individuals are free to 
engage in whatever act they wish.  As long as their act is part of the 
accepted pattern of social interaction, individuals do not have to bear any 
accident costs of others that result from their acts.  Individuals are equal, 
one could argue, in that each individual gets to participate in the accepted 
pattern of social interaction.  Accident costs are not assigned based on 
attributes of the individual but rather based on the individual’s acts.  If one 
individual deviates from the pattern and harms another, the deviator is 
assigned the accident costs of the individual that did not deviate from the 
accepted pattern.  One could argue that the accepted pattern provides a 
realm of equality by setting the standard for assigning accident costs in this 
way.      
Perry’s theory may obtain freedom and equality of individuals to some 
extent.  However, I do not think that it is the best interpretation of Kantian 
political theory.  Concerning treating persons as free, while individuals are 
free to participate in the accepted pattern of social interaction under Perry’s 
theory, they are not free to deviate from the accepted pattern without risking 
being assigned the costs of anyone accidentally harmed by their deviation.  
The accepted pattern of social interaction could encompass a wide swathe 
of acts or it could be narrow.  Since Perry places no requirements on the 
breadth of the accepted pattern, the amount of freedom to act without 
risking liability may be large or small depending on what the accepted 
pattern is.  Individuals who see themselves as free would likely want an 
alternative arrangement than Perry’s theory in order to protect their freedom 
as much as fair terms of social cooperation allow. 
Another shortcoming for Perry’s theory is that it does not explain how 
those who do not accept the ‘accepted pattern’ are treated as either free or 
equal.  Recall that Perry’s theory cannot require everyone to accept every 
aspect of the ‘accepted pattern of social interaction.’  Doing so would risk 
requiring too high of a standard that no actual pattern could meet.  Thus, 
some individuals in the society do not accept the accepted pattern of social 
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interaction.  Let’s call them ‘dissenters.’  Dissenters may be free like 
everyone else to act in accordance with the accepted pattern of social 
interaction without being subject to liability.  However, they are likely 
powerless to alter an aspect of the accepted pattern given that they have a 
minority view on that aspect.  Those that accept the accepted pattern of 
social interaction (‘accepters’) may also, as individuals, be powerless to 
change the pattern.  However, the powerlessness of the accepters does not 
seem problematic because they accept the pattern whereas the 
powerlessness of the dissenters appears more problematic.  At least, 
explaining how the dissenters are just as free as the accepters needs to be 
worked out. 
Even if dissenters are just as free (in some sense) as the accepters, the 
dissenters do not seem to be treated as equals with the acceptors.  The 
accepted pattern of social interaction does not seem to value the dissenters’ 
interests on an issue to the same extent as it values the accepters’ interests.  
The difference in value results from the different treatment when assigning 
accident costs.  Acts that involve the differing interests of the dissenters are 
subject to liability if another is harmed whereas the acts that involve the 
interests of the accepters are not subject to liability if another is harmed.  If 
both dissenters and acceptors were to act according to their respective 
interests, dissenters would bear more risk of being assigned others’ accident 
costs than the accepters would bear.  On face, dissenters do not seem to be 
treated as equals.  Therefore, Perry’s theory does not seem to treat persons 
as equal to a significant extent as required by Kantian political theory. 
It is true that Perry’s theory treats everyone as equals in that the same 
standard for assigning accident costs is applied to everyone in the same 
way.  However, as I pointed out earlier, every plausible theory of assigning 
accident costs has this virtue because each theory would apply the same 
standard to everyone. 
Since Perry’s accepted pattern theory is incomplete and insufficiently 
justified, the question remains whether another theory of assigning accident 
costs better captures Kantian political theory.  In the final section, I briefly 
outline a theory that answers the central normative concern.  This theory 
could offer the best interpretation of Kantian political theory compared to 
any of the extant theories of assigning accident costs. 
VI. Democratic Community Standard Theory 
I offer what I call ‘democratic community standard theory’ as the best 
interpretation of Kantian political theory and as the most persuasive answer 
to the central normative concern.  While a complete defense of democratic 
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community standard theory must await another time, I sketch its main 
features.124   
In democratic community standard theory, the community’s evaluations 
of risk establish a threshold of risk for each kind of act.  Putting this theory 
in terms of the central normative concern, the community’s evaluation of 
risk should determine the amount of precaution an individual must employ 
to avoid being justifiably assigned others’ costs from an accident.   
The community’s evaluation of a risk is determined by how the majority 
of the members in the community evaluate the kind of risk in question.  If 
one performs an act above the threshold of risk for that kind of act, then one 
has violated the democratic community standard.  Violating the democratic 
community standard means that one is subject to being assigned any 
resulting accident costs of others.  As long as one’s act is at or below the 
community’s threshold of risk, one has met the democratic community 
standard.  Having met the democratic community standard means that one 
should not be assigned others’ accident costs.  Democratic community 
standard theory provides a transparent and complete assignment of accident 
costs preferable to Weinrib’s vague reliance on the concept of reasonable. 
The democratic community standard is comprised (in most cases) of the 
community’s actual evaluations of risk.  In this way, democratic community 
standard theory bears a resemblance to one possible interpretation of 
component B of Fletcher’s reciprocal risk theory where background risks 
are the risks that a community accepts as part of daily life.   
Furthermore, recall that I pointed out a conception of component B 
based on agreement to a regime of risk does not seem open to Fletcher for 
three reasons.  First, such an interpretation is still in tension with component 
A of reciprocal risk theory because it does not look at the details of the 
background risks to assign accident costs. 
Second, Fletcher does not place any requirements on how the 
background risks are formed.  If background risks were just what 
individuals do on a consistent basis, then individuals that are more powerful 
or special interest groups would be able to unfairly impose their preferred 
risks as part of the background risks.  In democratic community standard 
                                                 
124 Democratic community standard theory need not and (in my view) does not apply to 
all accidents.  For example, for individuals living with mental illness or low mental ability, 
I think the accident costs should be handled according to social tort insurance, as I argue in 
a separate piece (on file with the author).  In my view, democratic community standard 
theory does not apply to accidents involving commercial and governmental acts.  Rather, 
the theory is part of a comprehensive Kantian approach to accidents that I will articulate in 
a future piece.   
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theory, the community’s actual evaluations of risk would only be 
invalidated if they were based on fraud, violated constitutional rights, or 
like. 
Finally, a theory that assigns accident costs based on community 
acceptance of risk does not fit with Fletcher’s justificatory principle.  
Reciprocity does not seem to be the driving justification for an 
interpretation of background risks based on community acceptance of risk.  
Since one person could be harmed extensively by others engaged in 
background risks without receiving compensation, it is a stretch to say that 
he reciprocally enjoys the same security as others.   
Instead, what seems to be doing the normative work is that the 
individual’s freedom to pursue her life plan is balanced against others’ 
ability to do the same.  In this process, no one is guaranteed the same 
amount of security.  Some will get more than others depending on their life 
plans and their luck.  However, individuals are counted equally in 
determining the democratic community standard.  Even if community 
acceptance of a regime of risk is what Fletcher means by background risks, 
then democratic community standard theory places this theory on its proper 
normative justification, namely, democracy. 
Having distinguished democratic community standard theory from the 
concept of background risks, I address where the community’s evaluations 
of risk are found.  The community’s actual evaluations of risk can be found 
in the beliefs and practices of that community.  Examples of such sources 
include social norms, regular patterns of behavior, conventions, customs, 
moral beliefs, community-endorsed laws, beliefs about common sense, and 
so on.  In this way, democratic community standard theory differs from 
Perry’s accepted pattern theory.  Perry’s theory uses ‘accepted patterns of 
social cooperation’ as criteria for assigning accident costs.  In contrast, 
democratic community standard theory uses the community’s evaluations of 
risks as criteria for assigning accident costs.  An accepted pattern of social 
cooperation is a possible piece of evidence for the community’s evaluation 
of a risk, but it is not determinative.  The accepted pattern is rebuttable if 
other sources of the community’s evaluation of the risk more strongly 
support another threshold of risk.   
Returning to the phoning while driving example, if phoning while 
driving is a pattern of behavior that is accepted (in some sense), phoning 
while driving could still fall below the community’s evaluation of risk, 
according to democratic community standard theory, if a traffic law against 
phoning while driving was recently passed according to acceptable 
democratic procedures.  Hence, other beliefs and practices in addition to an 
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‘accepted pattern’ are evidence for the community’s evaluation of risk in 
democratic community standard theory.  
In using these various beliefs and practices as evidence of the 
community’s evaluations of risk (i.e., the democratic community standard), 
communities are able to combine and trade-off values according to the 
relative weight they attach to each value.125  In this way, the democratic 
community standard embodies the multiple values of the community 
weighted by the community rather than a single value such as efficiency or 
values foreign to the community.  By providing a concrete mechanism to 
trade-off multiple important values, democratic community standard theory 
provides what is missing from Ripstein’s theory of freedom and equality. 
Recall that social welfare theory was incomplete because it lacked a 
way to weight the values of acts.  Democratic community standard theory 
provides a way to weight and trade-off values that furthers the values of the 
community.  Democratic community standard theory also solves one 
problem with narrow utilitarianism by allowing a community to prevent 
individuals from being exposed to liability from others’ trivial acts.  Those 
who engage in trivial acts according to the democratic community standard 
are subject to being assigned any resulting accident costs.  
Within each community, democratic community standard theory does 
not require that the community have a threshold of risk above zero for each 
kind of act.  The democratic community standard need not always absolve 
the agent from liability if she meets a threshold level of risk.  The 
community evaluations of risk could be such that no amount of precaution 
is sufficient to absolve an individual of being assigned any resulting 
accident costs.  The comparison here is with the tort doctrine of strict 
liability.   
The community evaluations of risk could have the same effect as strict 
liability for particular kinds of acts for a number of reasons.  The 
community could not value a kind of act that much.  The community could 
be adverse to the kinds of harms that can result from a kind of act.  The 
community could think that certain kinds of acts are more prone to accident.  
The community may think certain kinds of acts are only worthwhile if such 
kinds of acts pay for the harms they cause.  The benefit of a kind of act 
could largely go to one segment of the community while the risks of harm 
largely affect a separate segment of the community.  For these and other 
possible reasons, the community could prefer that individuals engaged in 
                                                 
125 See also, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law 
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010). 
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certain risky kinds of acts be assigned the costs of any accidents regardless 
of the precaution employed. 
Consequently, democratic community standard theory harmonizes the 
normative criteria for the two standards of care in tort doctrine, negligence 
and strict liability.  Since the community evaluation of a risk is the sole 
criterion for assigning accident costs, using the negligence standard or strict 
liability should involve determining the community's evaluation of the risk 
of the kind of act in question.  So, whether to use the negligence standard or 
strict liability for a particular accident would not be based on judicial 
discretion or precedent.  By only using one criterion for assigning accident 
costs democratic community standard theory provides a more theoretically 
harmonious theory than the reasonable person theory with its unexplained 
side-kick strict liability. 
Earlier I identified an ambiguity in the reasonable person standard 
theory regarding the scope of the society or community; the theory did not 
say whether the city, state, country or other group filled out the 
requirements of the reasonable person.  To avoid having that ambiguity, 
democratic community standard theory uses a concept of community that is 
delineated by geographical boundaries.  By geographical boundaries, I do 
not mean that certain features of the land separate communities.  Instead, I 
mean that the community is a group of people that share a section of the 
Earth based on their interactions, especially the kinds of interactions that led 
to the accident.  As a result, democratic community standard theory does 
not have one particular size of community in mind.  In other words, the 
community could be a neighborhood, town, a state, a nation, or even a 
larger group.  Instead, democratic community standard theory provides the 
criterion for delineating the boundaries of the relevant community for 
assigning the costs of a particular accident.  The criterion is the nature of the 
acts that led to the accident and what should have been the expectations of 
those who were party to the accident.   
To operationalize democratic community standard theory, the decision-
maker who applies the democratic community standard does not have to be 
a member of the community.  For instance, in the judicial setting the judge 
and jury would not have to be comprised of members of the relevant 
community.  Instead, the plaintiff and defendant could have people from the 
relevant community testify as to what the democratic community standard 
is regarding the defendant’s kind of act.  If jury members are from the 
relevant community, then the jury instructions need to explicitly guide them 
to ascertain what the community standard in their community is rather than 
some religious or objective moral standard as the reasonable person theory 
could suggest. 
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Democratic community standard theory uses democracy in a substantive 
sense rather than a procedural sense.  Pure substantive democracy is mostly 
interested in the content of laws rather than the procedures that produce 
those laws.  Democratic community standard theory’s substantive criteria 
for evaluating the assignment of accident costs are the community 
evaluations of risk in most cases.   
Due to its use of substantive democracy, democratic community 
standard theory does not require procedures that are often associated with 
democracy such as voting to elect law-making officials, elected officials 
voting on proposed laws, universal suffrage voting on proposed laws (i.e. 
referendum), transparent elections, and so on.  Let me call this sense of 
democracy, where democracy is constituted primarily by some or all of 
these procedures, ‘procedural democracy.’  Pure procedural democracy as a 
theory about the moral justifiability of laws does not evaluate the content of 
a law by an external criterion.  Whatever laws are made by its procedures 
are morally justifiable.  
In contrast, democratic community standard theory does not require any 
particular democratic procedures to make decisions about assigning 
accident costs.  Thus, democratic community standard theory should not be 
interpreted as a theory of procedural democracy.  For instance, the upshot of 
democratic community standard theory is not that legislatures as opposed to 
courts should be assigning accident costs.  Democratic community standard 
theory would endorse particular institutional mechanisms based on their 
instrumental effectiveness in instantiating its substantive criteria, that is, in 
assigning accident costs according to the community’s evaluations of risk.   
One may raise the same concern with democratic community standard 
theory that I raised with Perry’s theory: how does one determine the 
democratic community standard especially when beliefs and practices vary 
in a community?  In such a situation, evidence for what is the majority 
community evaluation of a risk may conflict.  Let’s illustrate this possibility 
with the example of Woomin and Eman.  Suppose again that in this 
community, most people believe that phoning while driving is not a 
worthwhile risk as evidenced by what they say in community discussions 
and how they behave when observing someone phoning while driving.  
However, at the same time, a large majority of the community, including 
those that believe that phoning while driving is not worthwhile, often phone 
while driving themselves with little to no cognitive dissonance.   
One way to address such a case is to see if we have reason to discount 
one side of the conflicting evidence for the community’s evaluation of a 
risk.  For example, the beliefs of most individuals about how much phoning 
while driving increases the likelihood of a vehicular accident may be 
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erroneous.  If these individuals knew how much phoning while driving 
actually increases the risk of accidents, then they may change their spoken 
statements about the evaluation of the risk of phoning while driving to 
match their actual behavior.     
Assume from now on that nothing suggests we should discount the 
evidence on either side of the conflict.  The community’s evaluation of the 
risky kind of act is based on the most reliable information available.  The 
behavior that contradicts the community’s spoken evaluation of the risk is 
not based on free-riding, self-deceit, or anything else that would make us 
discount that behavior.  If so, then evidence based on community beliefs 
seems to support that phoning while driving exceeds the community’s 
threshold for risk and at the same time evidence based on community 
practices seems to support that phoning while driving meets the 
community’s threshold for risk.  Due to the conflicting evidence, it would 
seem that no majority community evaluation of the risk exists. 
To resolve this conflict, we should view conflicting evidence within its 
historical context.  If the current evidence points to equal evidence for and 
against whether a risk is worthwhile, then a tie about what is the 
community’s evaluation of risk should depend on the newness of the risk.  
If the risk is relatively new, then without more evidence on its side the risk 
should be considered above the community threshold for risk because the 
community has not yet endorsed that risk.  If the risk has existed for a long 
time and community views are shifting about whether it is a worthwhile 
risk, then the evaluation of the risk should remain wherever it was prior to 
the shifting until a new view gains enough ground to provide clear evidence 
that it is the majority view.   
These conclusions rest on the core idea in democratic community 
standard theory: the most important criterion to assigning accident costs is 
whether the community has endorsed the risk.  For a new risk, no clear 
endorsement means that the risk is not evaluated by the community as 
worthwhile.  Without a clear endorsement of changes to the community’s 
evaluation of a risk, the status quo should remain.  In so doing, the central 
normative concern is answered: A person only need to meet the democratic 
community standard of risk to avoid being justifiably assigned another’s 
accident costs. 
VII. Conclusion 
While the democratic community standard requires much more 
exploration, what I have said sufficiently suggests that extant rights-based 
theories are inadequate to the task of answering the central normative 
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concern.  To develop a compelling rights-based theory of assigning accident 
costs, democratic community standard theory merits more investigation. 
 
 
 
